De-centring the securitization of asylum and migration in the European Union: Securitization, vulnerability and the role of Turkey by Léonard, Sarah & Kaunert, Christian
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fgeo20
Geopolitics
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fgeo20
De-centring the Securitisation of Asylum and
Migration in the European Union: Securitisation,
Vulnerability and the Role of Turkey
Sarah Léonard & Christian Kaunert
To cite this article: Sarah Léonard & Christian Kaunert (2021): De-centring the Securitisation of
Asylum and Migration in the European Union: Securitisation, Vulnerability and the Role of Turkey,
Geopolitics, DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2021.1929183
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2021.1929183
© 2021 The Author(s). Published with
license by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
Published online: 01 Jun 2021.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 440
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
De-centring the Securitisation of Asylum and Migration in 
the European Union: Securitisation, Vulnerability and the 
Role of Turkey
Sarah Léonarda a,b and Christian Kaunertb a,b
aDepartment of Social Sciences, University of the West of England, Bristol, UK; bInternational Centre for 
Policing and Security, University of South Wales, Pontypridd, UK
ABSTRACT
This article contributes to the debates on de-centring the ana-
lysis of migration governance in Europe by focusing on the 
potential role of external actors in the securitisation of asylum 
and migration in the European Union (EU). Although there has 
been a growing amount of literature on the securitisation of 
asylum and migration in the EU, the role possibly played by 
external actors in this securitisation process has not been con-
sidered to date. This article addresses this gap using the case of 
Turkey. Theoretically, it contributes to the development of the 
securitisation framework by de-centring the study of securitisa-
tion processes. It argues that, from the vantage point of an 
external actor, a securitisation process highlights the existence 
of a vulnerability to a specific phenomenon that is perceived to 
be threatening. An external actor can then decide to exploit this 
vulnerability for its own gain, notably by making threats that 
play on the fears of the other political actor. Empirically, the 
article demonstrates how the Turkish government has been 
able to exploit the vulnerability of European countries to migra-
tion flows, which had been highlighted by the social construc-
tion of asylum and migration as security issues. By repeatedly 
threatening to send more asylum-seekers and migrants 
Europe’s way, the Turkish authorities have managed to secure 
some significant financial and political benefits for themselves 
in the last few years.
Introduction
Migration has become one of the most salient political issues in Europe in 
recent years. This has notably resulted from the linkages that have been made 
between migration and security, both discursively and through the deploy-
ment of specific practices. Regarding the former, a wide range of actors have 
made statements linking migration to security in the last few years. For 
example, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán described migration as 
the ‘Trojan wooden horse of terrorism’ at the 2017 Malta Congress of the 
European People’s Party (Brunsden 2017), whilst French Presidential hopeful 
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Marine Le Pen declared that ‘[with] the serious terror threat that weighs on us, 
we have to be able to control who enters to be able to expel those who 
represent a danger’ (Dearden 2017). More recently, the announcement made 
in 2019 by the then incoming President of the European Commission, Ursula 
von der Leyen, that a new portfolio for ‘Protecting our European Way of Life’ 
was to be created in her future College of Commissioners also appeared to 
connect migration to security. Both the title and the contents of this newly- 
created portfolio – which was to bring together a wide range of matters, 
including asylum, migration, culture, skills, education, religion and security 
-, drew strong criticism from a range of observers (Tidey 2019).
As for practices linking migration to security, European authorities have 
increasingly developed or acquired technological devices – including some 
originally developed in the military sector – supporting the identification 
and interception of migrants at border sites. Those include surveillance 
cameras, thermal imaging equipment, sensors, satellites, heat sensors, carbon 
dioxide detectors and drones (Dijstelbloem, Meijer, and Besters 2011). For 
example, in the EU, Eurosur has been created in order to provide a common 
framework for the exchange of information, with a view to providing ‘a 
European Situational Picture and a Common Pre-Frontier Intelligence 
Picture respectively at the external borders of the EU and outside’ (Frontex 
2015, 3). Information is taken from various sources, which include ‘ship 
reporting, satellite sensor or other systems’ (Frontex 2015, 3). The system 
officially aims to simultaneously tackle irregular migration and counter 
cross-border crime, whilst saving lives at sea (Rijpma and Vermeulen 
2015, 467).
Over the years, an increasing amount of scholars have examined these 
linkages between asylum and migration on the one hand and security on the 
other (Bourbeau 2017). A large number of them have drawn upon the 
Copenhagen School’s ‘securitisation’ theory (Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde 
1998) in order to analyse these developments (see Léonard and Kaunert 2019). 
With few exceptions (see Boswell 2007; Neal 2009), they have generally argued 
that asylum and migration have been successfully ‘securitised’ – that is, socially 
constructed as security threats – in the EU. However, although this field of 
study has significantly grown over the years, its focus to date has been on 
examining the internal dynamics of securitisation processes.
In contrast, the role of external actors in the securitisation of asylum and 
migration in the EU has not been considered. This is intriguing, given the 
extent to which the EU has developed relations on asylum and migration 
matters with third states in the last few decades. It has done so using a wide 
range of political, legal, operational and financial instruments, such as read-
mission agreements, mobility partnerships, visa facilitation agreements, and 
regional protection programmes (European Parliament 2015). A third state 
with which the EU has particularly developed relations in the field of asylum 
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and migration is Turkey, as epitomised by the signing of the controversial so- 
called ‘EU-Turkey Statement’ of 18 March 2016 (European Council 2016).
As a consequence, this article addresses the topic of the role of external 
actors in the securitisation of asylum and migration in the EU, which has been 
neglected to date. It does so using the case of Turkey, as it appears to have 
played a significant role in the governance of asylum and migration in the EU. 
Methodologically, a range of documents are analysed, including EU official 
documents and media reports on EU-Turkey relations over asylum and 
migration. The remainder of this article is structured into five sections. First, 
it considers the burgeoning literature on the securitisation of asylum and 
migration in the EU and highlights that it has neglected considering the role 
of external actors in this process. Second, it introduces the securitisation 
framework and examines whether the role of external actors in securitisation 
processes in general has been conceptualised. As this question is answered 
negatively, the article puts forward the argument that a crucial aspect of 
a securitisation process from the vantage point of an external actor is that it 
reveals a vulnerability that can be exploited by this external actor for its own 
advantage. Moving on to the specific case of Turkey, the third section sets the 
context by discussing EU-Turkey relations in general and with regard to 
asylum, migration and border matters in particular. The following section 
discusses how Turkey has attempted to exploit the vulnerability of European 
countries to flows of asylum-seekers and migrants – given that asylum-seekers 
and migrants have been securitised in the EU – in the context of the Syrian 
refugee crisis. It examines the various migration-related threats made by the 
Turkish government and highlights what it has gained as a result. The final 
section offers some conclusions.
The Securitisation of Asylum and Migration in the EU
The last two decades have seen a significant growth in the literature on the 
securitisation of asylum and migration in the EU. This has notably reflected 
the increasing role that the EU has acquired in that policy area (Geddes, Hadj 
Abdou, and Brumat 2020; Léonard and Kaunert 2019). Although some have 
sought to put forward a more nuanced argument (see Boswell 2007; Neal 
2009), a commonly held view in the existing literature has been that asylum 
and migration have been successfully securitised in the EU, that is, socially 
constructed as security issues. Within that debate, scholars have pursued two 
main lines of enquiry, which have not been mutually exclusive. First, some 
contributions have focused on the actors involved in and the processes under-
pinning the securitisation of asylum and migration (e.g., Bourbeau 2011; 
Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002; Huysmans 2000, 2006; Lazaridis and Wadia 
2015). An important contribution to the analysis of the processes through 
which migration has been securitised in Europe has been made by Bigo (1998, 
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2002), who has highlighted the importance of practices, in contrast to the 
emphasis placed on ‘speech acts’ (i.e. discourse) in the original conceptualisa-
tion of securitisation by the Copenhagen School. Huysmans (2006), Balzacq 
(2008) and Léonard (2010) have further explored the role of practices in the 
securitisation of asylum-seekers and migrants in the EU. Second, other con-
tributions have critically examined the consequences of the securitisation of 
asylum and migration in Europe, including negative, unintended conse-
quences (e.g., Bello 2017; Chebel d’Appollonia 2012; Karyotis 2011). Some of 
those have called for strategies to ‘desecuritize’ migration (Huysmans 1995) or 
to develop a more ‘inclusionary’ approach to asylum in Europe (Squire 2009). 
Thus, the idea that asylum and migration have been securitised in Europe has 
been widely shared in the academic literature.
Whilst these scholarly works have greatly contributed to our understand-
ing of the securitisation of asylum and migration in the EU, they have 
omitted to consider an important factor, namely the potential role of external 
actors, that is, non-EU actors, in the securitisation of asylum and migration 
in the EU. This concern is prompted by the fact that, in recent years, the EU 
has steadily developed relations on asylum and migration matters with non- 
EU countries (i.e. ‘third countries’ in EU jargon), which has been documen-
ted by a growing amount of scholarly work. Whilst early academic literature 
emphasised the existence of a largely asymmetric relationship between the 
EU and third countries in favour of the EU (e.g. Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig 2009), several scholars have more recently argued that one 
should not underestimate the agency of third countries in their relationship 
with the EU, especially when it comes to the governance of specific policy 
issues, such as migration (e.g., El Qadim 2015; Wolff and Trauner 2014; 
Wunderlich 2012). Others have gone even further by arguing that some 
governments have managed to instrumentalise flows of asylum-seekers and 
migrants towards Europe in order to successfully increase their leverage over 
European governments (Okyay and Zaragoza-Cristiani 2016; Paoletti 2011; 
Tsourapas 2017, 2019; Völkel 2020). Such ideas echo the concept of the 
‘weaponisation’ of asylum and migration flows originally developed by 
Greenhill (2010, 2016), which entails ‘the intentional creation, manipulation, 
and exploitation of migration and refugee crises’ for foreign policy purposes 
(Greenhill 2010, 2). One of the most prominent examples of the instrumen-
talisation of migration flows was Libya under Muammar al-Gaddafi (Paoletti 
2011; Tsourapas 2017). More recently, some scholars have turned their 
attention towards Turkey and its use of the issue of migration in its relations 
with European countries. For example, Okyay and Zaragoza-Cristiani (2016) 
have argued that, thanks to its position as a migration ‘gatekeeper’, Turkey 
has been able to gain leverage over the EU and to increase its bargaining 
power in the negotiations that led to the adoption of the EU-Turkey agree-
ment on migration. For his part, Tsourapas (2019) has claimed that the 
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Turkish government has engaged in a specific type of what he terms ‘refugee 
rent-seeking behaviour’ in its relations with the EU, namely ‘blackmailing’, 
which he defines as ‘threatening to flood a target state(s) with refugee 
populations within its borders, unless compensated’. Thus, various scholars 
have documented the growth in the relations between the EU and third 
countries on asylum and migration matters. Recently, there has been an 
increasing acknowledgement that third countries are not just passive recipi-
ents of the EU’s policies, but actually possess agency in migration govern-
ance. This therefore points to the potentially important role of third 
countries in the securitisation of asylum and migration in the EU, which 
has not been analysed to date. The remainder of this article examines this 
hitherto neglected topic by focusing on the case of Turkey. This country has 
been selected given the important role that it appears to have played in the 
governance of asylum and migration in the EU, as epitomised by the signing 
of the EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016 (European Council 2016).
Securitisation Processes and External Actors
Before one can analyse the role of Turkey in the securitisation of asylum and 
migration in the EU, it is necessary to first present the securitisation frame-
work, before considering how – if at all – the role of outsiders has been 
conceptualised in the literature on securitisation. At the heart of the secur-
itisation framework, which was originally developed by the so-called 
‘Copenhagen School’, lies the idea that security threats do not objectively 
exist, ‘out there’ (Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde 1998). Rather, security threats 
come into existence as the result of processes of ‘securitisation’, which can be 
understood as ‘processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is to 
be considered and collectively responded to as a threat’ (Buzan, Wæver, and 
De Wilde 1998, 26). Moreover, still according to the Copenhagen School, this 
social construction of security threats takes place through the utterance of 
‘speech acts’ (Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde 1998: 26; see also Wæver 1995, 
54–55). In a ‘securitising move’, an actor presents a phenomenon as a threat to 
the survival of a so-called ‘referent object’. After the audience of this securitis-
ing move has accepted it, securitisation has successfully taken place. 
Furthermore, the Copenhagen School argues that, by ‘uttering security’, the 
securitising actor ‘moves a particular development into a specific area, and 
thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it’ 
(Wæver 1995, 55).
Over the years, the securitisation framework has generated 
a considerable amount of debates, leading to the development of a large 
body of literature (see Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka 2016). In particular, 
some scholars have highlighted some under-developed aspects of the 
framework – such as the issue of the relationship between the securitising 
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actor and the audience (e.g., Léonard and Kaunert 2010) – and have 
attempted to develop them further (Balzacq 2005; McDonald 2008; 
Stritzel 2007).
However, what is remarkable in the literature on securitisation is the over-
whelming focus of most scholars on the internal dynamics of securitisation 
and the concomitant neglect of the potential role of external actors (or out-
siders) in securitisation processes. In other words, there has not been any 
research explicitly considering the possible role of external actors in securiti-
sation, which was not included in the original securitisation framework devel-
oped by the Copenhagen School either. However, it is conceivable that some 
scholars could have implicitly or indirectly addressed the role of outsiders 
whilst using other concepts. Given that outsiders evidently do not belong to 
the category of ‘securitising actors’, there are arguably two main concepts to 
consider in that respect, namely ‘functional actors’ and ‘counter-securitising 
actors’. ‘Functional actors’ is a category that was identified by Wæver and 
Buzan themselves. However, they left its definition extremely vague. They 
merely noted that ‘functional actors’ can be defined as ‘actors who affect the 
dynamics of a sector’ and ‘who significantly [influence] decisions in the field of 
security’ without being a securitising actor or the referent object (Buzan, 
Wæver, and De Wilde 1998, 36). Moreover, for a long time, this aspect of 
the securitisation framework was not explicitly considered or further devel-
oped by other scholars. However, a recent article by Floyd (2020) has argued 
that functional actors have usually been referred to as audiences in the 
burgeoning literature on securitisation. Thus, apart from highlighting the 
importance of distinguishing outsiders from functional actors, the literature 
on functional actors does not shed any significant light on the potential role of 
outsiders in securitisation processes. As for the concept of ‘counter- 
securitising actors’, which can be coined on the basis of the limited literature 
on counter-securitisation that has been written (e.g., Stritzel and Chang 2015; 
Vuori 2008), it appears to refer to actors attempting to contest and resist 
against a securitising move. However, whilst the category of counter- 
securitising actors may comprise outsiders (Stritzel and Chang 2015, 553), it 
is a much broader category, which also includes those who are the referent 
objects of the securitising move. One therefore needs to distinguish outsiders 
from counter-securitising actors. Apart from that insight, an examination of 
the literature on counter-securitisation does not shed light on the specific issue 
of the role of outsiders in securitisation.
Thus, the scholarship on securitisation, including the research that focuses 
on functional actors and counter-securitising actors, has not conceptualised 
the role of external actors neither explicitly nor implicitly. In the absence of 
any available conceptualisation of the role of external actors in securitisation 
in general, it is suggested here to return to the securitisation framework in its 
fundamental aspects and, in contrast to the usual focus on internal dynamics, 
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to consider securitisation processes from the vantage point of an external 
actor. This is fully in line with a de-centring research agenda. When doing 
so, it appears that one of the most salient aspects of a securitisation process is 
the fact that securitising an issue – i.e. socially constructing it as a threat to the 
survival of a referent object – simultaneously highlights a vulnerability in 
a referent object to a specific threat. For example, when political leaders are 
depicting migration flows as a fundamental threat to the survival of the 
customs and values of a given nation, they are simultaneously – albeit indir-
ectly and presumably not deliberately – highlighting how a nation is vulner-
able in that respect. They lay bare their fears and their concerns, which may be 
more or less shared across society, as they point themselves at a source of 
vulnerability and relative weakness. In turn, an external actor witnessing this 
securitisation process from the outside may decide to exploit this vulnerability 
for its own benefit.
Thus, for an external actor, one of the most important dimensions of 
a securitisation process is that it reveals a vulnerability of which it can take 
advantage. One of the most common ways in which an actor can exploit the 
vulnerability of another on the international stage is extortion – in 
a metaphorical way. Extortion refers to a situation ‘in which one person 
takes advantage of another person against his or her will by means of threat 
of violence or threat of harm of any kind to the person’ (Pehlivan 2014). In 
other words, extortion is about obtaining benefits through coercion. In this 
article, ‘extortion’ is used metaphorically, as this act has not been criminalised 
at the international level. Thus, it is argued here that, from the point of view of 
an external actor, the securitisation of an issue highlights a vulnerability, which 
this external actor can then choose to exploit for its own ends, notably through 
extortion. In such a scenario, an external actor threatens to take action 
targeting the vulnerability of another actor – which has been revealed through 
a securitisation process – in order to gain benefits. On the international stage, 
one can conceive of a wide range of possible benefits, which could be military, 
political or financial, amongst others.
Having presented the securitisation framework and conceptualised how an 
external actor can exploit a vulnerability highlighted by securitisation, it is now 
possible to examine the role that Turkey has played in the securitisation of 
asylum and migration in the EU in recent years.
Setting the Context: EU-Turkey Relations
In order to be able to assess the role of Turkey in the securitisation of asylum 
and migration in the EU, it is necessary to first locate it in its broader context. 
This section begins by examining Turkey’s relationship with the EU in general, 
before focusing on their relations on asylum, migration and border matters in 
particular. With regard to the wider context of Turkey’s relations with the EU, 
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those can be seen as having two main, inter-related elements. The first is the 
association that was established between the then European Economic 
Community (EEC) and Turkey through the Ankara Association Agreement 
in 1963 (Ott 2017, 8). This agreement notably aimed to create a customs union 
in three stages and highlighted in its preamble that ‘the support given by the 
European Economic Community to the efforts of the Turkish people to 
improve their standard of living will facilitate the accession of Turkey to the 
Community at a later date’ (italics added). The second component in the EU- 
Turkey relations is precisely the status of candidate country that Turkey only 
received in 1999, that is, twelve years after it applied for EEC/EU membership. 
This delay can be explained to a large extent by the controversial character of 
the Turkish membership of the EEC, which was divisive for several reasons 
(Nas and Özer 2017). One of them was the sheer size of the Turkish population 
and the importance that Turkey would therefore acquire within EEC/EU 
institutions and policy-making after its accession, in particular because of its 
future voting rights in the Council and in the European Parliament. Another 
reason was the significant cultural and socio-economic differences between 
Turkey and EEC/EU Member States (Saatçioğlu 2020). Yet another reason was 
the unsolved dispute over the island of Cyprus, the northern part of which had 
been invaded by Turkish forces in 1974 (Suvarierol 2003). Since then, acces-
sion negotiations have progressed very slowly and membership prospects have 
considerably decreased. Nevertheless, for various reasons (see Aydin and 
Kirişci 2013; Tolay 2014, 2), the EU has managed to have some impact on 
Turkish policies, notably those on asylum, migration and borders, to which 
this section now turns.
Concerning asylum, migration and borders, the EU has exercised some 
degree of influence over Turkish policies as part of the accession process. 
However, this influence has been characterised by contradictions. On the one 
hand, some reforms have been made to align Turkish legislation with the EU 
acquis communautaire. On the other hand, foreign policy considerations have 
led Turkey to adopt or to maintain some measures that have diverged from the 
EU’s own policies, notably in the field of visas (Yıldız 2016, 117–121). For 
example, Turkey introduced a mutual visa exemption regime with Syria in 
2009. Another persistent bone of contention between the EU and Turkey has 
been the latter’s refusal to lift the geographical limitation clause of the 1951 
Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol (Aydin and Kirişci 2013, 383), 
which means that it does not grant full refugee status, but only conditional 
refugee status, to persons fearing persecution as a result of events occurring 
outside Europe (Güler 2020).
Nevertheless, in the last few years, Turkey has taken some steps that have 
brought it closer to the EU again in some respects. In particular, in 
December 2013, Turkey signed a readmission agreement with the EU, whilst 
a visa liberalisation process was also launched (Açıkgöz 2015). Nevertheless, 
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the negotiation of that readmission agreement was long and cumbersome, as it 
had already started in 2002 (Ott 2017, 13). The Turkish authorities were rather 
reluctant to sign such an agreement, largely because of their fear that, as 
a result, Turkey could become a buffer area between the EU and various 
unstable countries in the region, which have sent significant numbers of 
asylum-seekers and migrants in the last few years. However, they were very 
determined to achieve visa-free travel for their citizens. After realising that this 
would not be achieved through rulings of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union interpreting the EU-Turkey association agreement (Ott 2017, 14), the 
Turkish government changed its negotiation strategy, thereby paving the way 
to the signing of the readmission agreement with the EU in December 2013. 
This agreement entails the readmission of Turkish nationals, as well as of 
third-country nationals and stateless persons as long as those have entered the 
EU through Turkey. In parallel, an EU-Turkey Visa liberalisation dialogue was 
launched, which mainly consists of a screening process of Turkey’s legislation 
and administrative practices by the European Commission on the basis of the 
‘Roadmap towards the visa-free regime with Turkey’ (European Commission 
2013a, 2013b). The dialogue mainly aims to make progress towards abolishing 
the visa obligation currently imposed on the Turkish citizens travelling to the 
Schengen area for a short-term visit. The roadmap identifies five areas in 
relation to which Turkey is required to make legislative and administrative 
reforms, namely document security, migration and border management, pub-
lic order and security, fundamental rights and the readmission of illegal 
migrants (European Commission 2013b). The launch of this visa liberalisation 
dialogue emphasised once again the importance for the Turkish government 
of achieving visa-free travel for its citizens on short-term visits. However, it is 
important to note that the roadmap did not include any specific timetable. On 
the contrary, it highlighted that ‘[the] pace of movement towards visa liberal-
isation [would] depend on Turkey’s progress in adopting and implementing 
the measures and fulfiling the requirements set out in this Roadmap, including 
full and effective implementation of the readmission agreement’ (European 
Commission 2013b). Moreover, although the process is called a ‘dialogue’, it 
has been significantly asymmetrical in favour of the EU, as it has been based on 
a document drawn up by the European Commission that identifies a long list 
of conditions that Turkey must fulfil before reaching its objective of being 
granted visa-free travel for its citizens.
The Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on Turkey and the EU
At the same time as Turkey has engaged in these negotiations with the EU, it 
has had to deal with the arrival of hundreds of thousands of people displaced 
by the Syrian conflict since 2011 (Tolay 2014). In line with the de-centring 
agenda, it is important to also consider this situation from the viewpoint of 
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the Turkish authorities. Before doing so, it is important to recall that, as 
previously mentioned, Turkey is one of few countries that has maintained 
the geographical limitation in the 1951 Geneva Convention. This can be 
explained by several long-term features, which are also highly relevant to 
understanding the attitude of the Turkish authorities in the face of the Syrian 
refugee crisis. First of all, there has been a concern in Turkey since the 
signing of the 1951 Geneva Convention that it is a country prone to receiv-
ing large flows of asylum-seekers because of its geographical location and the 
political situation in the neighbouring countries. It has been feared that the 
country could be overwhelmed with large numbers of asylum-seekers and 
irregular migrants, which could affect national security. In that respect, 
maintaining the geographical limitation in the 1951 Geneva Convention 
has been seen as a way of maintaining some degree of control over these 
migration flows, whilst managing relations with the governments of neigh-
bouring countries more smoothly (Kirişci 1996, 308–309). Moreover, it is 
important to recall that nation-building in the Turkish Republic has empha-
sised the ‘Turkishness’ of the country in contrast with the multi-religious 
and multi-ethnic character of the Ottoman Empire. In other words, tradi-
tionally, Turkey has tended to largely view itself as not being a country of 
immigration. Flows of asylum-seekers and migrants have therefore been 
regarded with a certain degree of suspicion given the impact that they 
could have on Turkish culture (Kirişci 1996, 309). Furthermore, the 
Turkish authorities have often perceived the international community, 
including European states and the EU, as not doing enough in terms of 
burden-sharing in times of humanitarian crises, whilst being overly critical 
of the Turkish efforts to deal with asylum-seekers and migrants (Kirişci 1996, 
309–310).
From spring 2011 onwards, Turkey began to receive large numbers of 
asylum-seekers from Syria (Tolay 2014). Those were originally treated as 
‘guests’, who did not receive any residence permit or official document 
confirming their status. Thus, although they enjoyed de facto protection 
from the Turkish state, they were not provided with the minimum 
guarantees laid down by the 1994 Turkish legislation on asylum. 
Following criticisms from the international community, the Turkish 
authorities decided to grant Syrian asylum-seekers temporary protection 
in October 2011 (Tolay 2014, 4), which was eventually enshrined in a new 
Law on Foreigners and International Protection adopted in April 2013 
(Zaragoza-Cristiani 2015, 15). This went hand in hand with significant 
efforts to support Syrian asylum-seekers, although the services provided to 
those outside camps – the majority of asylum-seekers – were more limited 
(Kirişci and Salooja 2014). By December 2013, more than 600,000 Syrians 
had found refuge in Turkey (Dinçer et al. 2013, 2). As emphasised by 
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Kirişci and Salooja (2014), ‘the Turkish government [. . .] [had] never 
opened its borders to refugees from the Middle East in this way’.
Over the next few months, the challenge for Turkey continued to grow, as 
the rate of arrival of Syrian asylum-seekers increased. From November 2014 
until August 2015, the number of registered refugees in Turkish camps went 
from 1,060,279 to 1,938,999 (Zaragoza-Cristiani 2015, 9). This notably 
resulted from the restrictive policies put in place by other countries in both 
the Middle East and Europe. Also, it is important to acknowledge that the 
difficulties faced by the Turkish authorities were partially self-inflicted. Whilst 
other countries introduced restrictions, the Turkish government prided itself 
on its so-called ‘open door’ policy (Oktav and Çelikaksoy 2015). This mainly 
aimed to raise its profile amongst Syrian refugees and across the Middle East 
and to develop its role as a regional leader (Kirişci and Salooja 2014).
By 2015, Turkey’s reception capacities were significantly overstretched as 
asylum-seekers continued to flee from the violence in Syria. The Turkish 
government called for more support from the international community 
(Tolay 2014, 5), of which it was simultaneously very critical at times. As 
underlined by some observers, this stance might have undermined its efforts 
at garnering more international support (Oktav and Çelikaksoy 2015). It was 
around that time that the effects of the Syrian refugee crisis began to be 
significantly felt in Europe, particularly in Greece and Italy. For example, in 
less than five days in August 2015, more than 40,000 people arrived in Greece 
by sea from Turkey (Zaragoza-Cristiani 2015, 2). In the following months, 
growing numbers of asylum-seekers and migrants made their way from 
Turkey to European countries by sea or by land. This resulted from 
a combination of factors, including advances of the so-called ‘Islamic State’ 
in Syria and a decrease in the ability and the willingness of the Turkish 
authorities to control the flows of asylum-seekers and migrants (Zaragoza- 
Cristiani 2015). In the space of a few months, more than one million people 
crossed the Mediterranean and entered the EU, which was widely perceived as 
a ‘crisis’. The fact that these flows of asylum-seekers and migrants were 
securitised in the EU – notably through a discursively constructed association 
between asylum-seekers and terrorists (Léonard and Kaunert 2019) – high-
lighted for the Turkish government a European vulnerability to migration that 
it could exploit for its own benefit.
Exploiting the EU’s Vulnerability: Turkey and Its Migration-related Threats
Against this background of a growing ‘crisis’ both in Turkey and in Europe, an 
EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan was adopted, which had two main parts. The 
first aimed to increase support for the Syrian displaced population and the 
Turkish communities hosting them, whereas the second focused on reinfor-
cing cooperation in order to prevent irregular migration, including intensified 
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information exchange and further support to strengthen Turkish capacities for 
addressing migrant smuggling (European Commission 2015). Part II also 
required Turkey to accelerate return procedures in line with the established 
bilateral readmission provisions, referring to the EU – Turkey Readmission 
Agreement of 2013 (European Commission 2015).
At an international summit between EU leaders and the Turkish govern-
ment on 29 November 2015, it was decided to activate the Joint Action Plan 
(European Council and Council of the European Union 2015). The EU also 
agreed to significantly increase its financial support through the ‘Refugee 
Facility for Turkey’, indicating that ‘[the] EU [was] committed to provide an 
initial 3 billion euro of additional resources’ (European Council and Council 
of the European Union 2015, 1). In addition to re-opening the accession 
negotiations, both parties agreed that the EU-Turkey readmission agreement 
would start becoming fully applicable from June 2016, whilst it was envisaged 
that the lifting of visa requirements for Turkish citizens on short-term stays in 
the Schengen area would be completed by October 2016 should all require-
ments listed in the Roadmap be met (European Council and Council of the 
European Union 2015). According to Reuters (2016), at a meeting with EU 
officials earlier in November, Turkish President Erdoğan would have 
demanded to receive six billion euros over two years and would have made 
threats towards Europe. He was quoted as having said ‘We can open the doors 
to Greece and Bulgaria anytime and we can put the refugees on buses [. . .] So 
how will you deal with refugees if you don’t get a deal? Kill the refugees?’ 
(Reuters 2016).
Despite the criticisms levelled at this EU-Turkey deal of November 2015 
(see European Council on Refugees and Exiles 2015), the EU concluded 
a further agreement with Turkey, which is known as the ‘EU-Turkey 
Statement’ of 18 March 2016. This agreement, the exact legal nature of 
which has been contested (Fernández Arribas 2017), reaffirmed the commit-
ment of Turkey and the EU to the Joint Action Plan of November 2015. It also 
stated that ‘[all] new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek 
islands as from 20 March 2016 [would] be returned to Turkey’, whilst ‘[for] 
every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian 
[would] be resettled from Turkey to the EU’ (European Council 2016, 1). In 
addition, the EU committed to both accelerating the disbursement of the 
3 billion euros that had initially been allocated to the Facility for Refugees in 
Turkey and mobilising an additional 3 billion euros (European Council 2016). 
Although this agreement has been very controversial and criticised on various 
grounds (Batalla Adam 2017), the European Commission has generally eval-
uated it positively on the basis that its implementation has led to significant 
decreases in the numbers of migrants attempting to cross the Aegean Sea to 
the Greek islands and of lives lost in the Aegean Sea (e.g., European 
Commission 2016, 2).
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However, this EU-Turkish deal had barely been agreed that the Turkish 
government took a threatening tone in April 2016. Continuing to exploit the 
fears of migration flows in European countries, Turkish Prime Minister 
Ahmet Davutoğlu emphasised that Turkey expected to receive funding and 
visa-free travel, as well as seeing progress in the EU membership negotiations, 
in return for controlling migration flows towards Europe. He stated that 
‘[these] pledges are mutual and that ‘[if] the EU does not take the necessary 
steps, it would be unthinkable for Turkey to do so’ (France 24 2016). In other 
words, ‘obviously nobody [could] expect Turkey to hold its side of the deal’ 
(France 24 2016). This followed similar statements made earlier on the 
same day by the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu. He 
notably stated that ‘[if] the EU doesn’t keep its word (. . .) we will cancel all 
agreements’ (France 24 2016).
The Turkish government put renewed pressure on the EU in July 2016, 
seeking to exploit the vulnerability of the EU Member States in the field of 
asylum and migration again. In an interview, Foreign Minister Mevlüt 
Çavuşoğlu emphasised that the Turkish government viewed the promised 
lifting of short-term visa restrictions by the EU as a crucial matter and that 
its government could back out of the agreement with the EU by October, if the 
EU did not grant visa-free travel to Turkish nationals. He highlighted the ‘very 
serious measures’ taken by Ankara to stem the flows of migrants and asylum- 
seekers towards the EU, but emphasised that ‘all that is dependent on the 
cancellation of the visa requirement for our citizens, which is also an item in 
the agreement of March 18ʹ (Al Jazeera 2016). Çavuşoğlu specified his threat 
when he stated that ‘[if] visa liberalisation does not follow, we will be forced to 
back away from the deal on taking back [refugees] and the agreement of 
18 March’ (Nielsen 2016).
These direct threats in rhetoric were reinforced by indirect threats exercised 
through relaxed migration controls. Those enabled over 1,000 migrants and 
asylum-seekers to cross from Turkey to the Greek islands in the last two weeks 
of July (Nielsen 2016). This was a clear reminder by the Turkish government 
to the EU and its Member States that it had the power to increase the 
migration flows that have caused them so much concern. Importantly, these 
threats and the increase in the migration flows towards Europe coincided with 
the aftermath of the attempted military coup against Erdoğan, which saw 
sweeping and extremely controversial purges across Turkish society 
(Amnesty International 2017). Thus, the Turkish authorities made migration- 
related threats, which they backed up with a demonstration of their ability to 
increase migrant arrivals in Europe, just as they were engaged in implementing 
repressive measures against large sections of Turkish society. Although some 
voices expressed their alarm at the unfolding post-coup crackdown, the official 
reactions of European governments and of the EU institutions were rather 
restrained. For instance, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
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Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, merely called for the ‘end of 
violence’ and the ‘protection of the rule of law’ (Deutsche Welle 2016).
The Turkish government reiterated migration-related threats at the end of 
November 2016. Referring to Kapikule, a Bulgarian border checkpoint where 
large numbers of migrants and asylum-seekers had gathered, President 
Erdoğan told European governments that ‘[if] you go any further, these border 
gates will be opened’ (Shaheen, Wintour, and Rankin 2016). Again, the 
Turkish government did not make this threat fortuitously. Erdoğan’s threat 
of abandoning the agreement made with the EU came in response to the 
adoption of a resolution on EU-Turkey negotiations in the European 
Parliament, which called on the European Commission and the Member 
States ‘to initiate a temporary freeze of the ongoing accession negotiations 
with Turkey’ (European Parliament 2016). This resolution, which was largely 
symbolic given its non-binding character, was itself prompted by the purges 
that followed the failed coup attempt against Erdoğan in July 2016.
New migration-related threats were issued by the Turkish government in 
March 2017. Playing on the widespread fear of large flows of asylum-seekers 
and migrants amongst EU Member States, Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu 
declared that Turkey ‘may cancel’ the agreements that it had signed with the 
EU in the field of migration (Saeed 2017). He specified that the Turkish 
authorities ‘are not applying the readmission agreement at the moment, and 
(. . .) are evaluating the refugee deal’ because of delays in the implementation 
of the visa liberalisation promised by the EU. Fellow Minister Suleyman Soylu, 
who is known as a hardliner close to President Erdoğan, went further by 
threatening to ‘blow the mind’ of European countries by letting go the 
‘15,000 refugees that we don’t send each month’ (Euractiv 2017). Again, 
these migration-related threats against European governments and the EU 
were deliberately made by the Turkish government at a very specific time. 
They came amidst renewed diplomatic tension between Turkey and European 
countries, which saw Erdoğan compare the Dutch and German governments 
to the Nazi regime (Yilmaz 2019, 243). This followed the cancellation by 
several European governments of rallies organised by the Turkish government 
for local Turkish communities in the run-up to a referendum on constitutional 
changes aiming to concentrate more power in the hands of the President (BBC 
News 2017; Saeed 2017). This link was made by Erdoğan himself when he 
declared the following:
Now they say readmission. What readmission? Forget about it. You don’t let my minister 
into the Netherlands. You revoke the landing rights of my foreign minister. You prevent 
[us] holding meetings at the General Consulate building, which is my land. But after that 
you’d expect us to do this [re-admit migrants]. That’s not going to happen’ (BBC News 
2017).
14 S. LÉONARD AND C. KAUNERT
Official reactions to the Turkish referendum in Europe were very restrained in 
public, as epitomised by a statement made by EU Commissioner for 
Enlargement, Johannes Hahn, in July 2017. He merely noted that the refer-
endum ‘raised concerns about the direction and the structure of some con-
stitutional amendments’ in Turkey (EUobserver 2017).
To date, the most advanced attempt by the Turkish authorities at exploiting 
the vulnerability of European countries and the EU when it comes to migra-
tion flows took place in winter 2020. On 27 February 2020, the Turkish 
government announced that it was opening its western borders and would 
no longer impede the movement of asylum-seekers and migrants trying to 
reach Europe (McKernan and Boffey 2020). In the space of a few hours, 
hundreds of people arrived at the Turkish border with Greece. According to 
various reports, the Turkish authorities did not merely tolerate the movement 
of migrants and asylum-seekers, but actually ‘encouraged and facilitated 
movement to the Greek border’ (Amnesty International 2020, 4). Amnesty 
International reported having ‘observed buses travelling towards the [Greek] 
border in convoy escorted by ambulance and police vehicles, state officials 
paying for fuel for buses and gendarmerie officers disembarking people and 
instructing them to walk the short remaining distance to the river Evros 
border’ (Amnesty International 2020, 10).
Erdoğan’s move can be interpreted as an attempt at instrumentalising 
migration flows in order to put European countries, the EU and the North- 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) under pressure to offer their support to 
Turkish military activities in Syria, in particular the ‘Spring Shield’ operation. 
This was launched after an airstrike – allegedly carried out by the Russian air 
force in the context of its wider support to the Syrian regime – had killed 
dozens of Turkish soldiers (McKernan 2020) in the midst of the battle for the 
control of the Syrian province of Idlib, which borders Turkey. President 
Erdoğan himself linked both issues when he declared to the Turkish 
Parliament that ‘[if] European countries want to resolve the issue [of migra-
tion], they must support Turkey’s efforts for political and humanitarian solu-
tions in Syria’ (Pitel, Foy, and Cornish 2020). Importantly, this threat to 
Europe was also made just before Erdoğan was due to meet with Russian 
President Putin to discuss a possible ceasefire agreement (Pitel, Foy, and 
Cornish 2020). In addition, it was suggested that, as Turkish public opinion 
had become increasingly critical of the military casualties in the conflict in 
Syria, President Erdoğan must have also hoped that polemic on migration 
would shift attention away from domestic politics to criticising European 
countries (Aydintasbas 2020).
Over the next few days, thousands of people continued to move towards the 
Turkish border with Greece (Pitel, Foy, and Cornish 2020). On 4 March 2020, 
it was estimated that about 12,500 people had gathered on the Turkish side of 
the Turkish-Greek border (Oltermann 2020). Given the announcement of the 
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Turkish authorities, they had expected to be able to cross the border and enter 
Europe (Amnesty International 2020, 10).
However, far from opening their border, the Greek authorities had rapidly 
stepped up border security measures and met these migration flows with 
a strong response. Teargas and stun grenades were fired to dissuade migrants 
and asylum-seekers from approaching and crossing the border (Oltermann 
2020; Statewatch 2020). In a concerning development, asylum-seekers 
reported the use of violence by Greek border guards to repel them (Amnesty 
International 2020; Statewatch 2020). The Greek authorities also requested the 
deployment of rapid border intervention teams (RABITs), which are coordi-
nated by Frontex with a view to giving immediate assistance to a Member State 
in a situation of urgent and exceptional pressure at its external borders
Moreover, on 2 March 2020, a government decree was passed, which 
suspended the registration of asylum claims for a month for people 
entering the country irregularly from 1 March, enabling the authorities 
to return them to their country of transit or origin without their asylum 
claim having been registered (European Council on Refugees and Exiles 
2020). The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) criticised this decision (UNHCR 2020). However, the European 
Commission declined to comment on the legality of the decision of the 
Greek authorities. A Commission spokesperson argued that ‘[the] com-
mission is not a court and does not have the authority to have a definitive 
legal opinion’ (Nielsen 2020). EU Home Affairs Commissioner Johansson 
merely recalled that ‘[individuals] in the European Union have the right 
to apply for asylum’ (Rankin 2020b). European Commission President von 
der Leyen went controversially further by praising Greece for ‘being our 
European “aspida” in these times’ (i.e. ‘shield’ in Greek) (Jamieson 2020), 
whilst announcing that it would receive €700 m in EU funds, notably for 
strengthening its border infrastructure (Rankin 2020a). The strong 
response of the Greek authorities also received the backing of the 
German government. Although protesters called for the European borders 
to be opened to asylum-seekers and migrants coming from Turkey, 
German Interior Minister Seehofer stated that the government did not 
want ‘a repeat of the year 2015ʹ (Oltermann 2020). The Interior ministry 
also sent tweets in several languages in strong support of the Greek 
authorities: ‘We need orderly conditions at the EU’s external border. We 
will use our best efforts to support Greece in achieving this. Europe’s 
borders are not open for #refugees from #Turkey, and neither are our 
German borders’ (Oltermann 2020).
Confronted with this firm response, which indicated that European 
states would not allow for a new ‘refugee crisis’ to unfold, the Turkish 
government backed down and began to organise the transportation of 
migrants stuck near the Turkish-Greek border back to Turkish cities 
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(Stevis-Gridneff and Kingsley 2020b). On 9 March 2020, Turkish 
President Erdoğan met with the President of the European Commission, 
Ursula von der Leyen, and the President of the European Council, Charles 
Michel, in Brussels. At the subsequent press conference, von der Leyen 
acknowledged that ‘Turkey needs support’, which ‘involves finding a path 
forward with Turkey’ (European Commission 2020a).
According to media reports, following this episode, the Turkish govern-
ment continued to ‘[press] European leaders to make fresh cash pledges to 
prevent tens of thousands of refugees from leaving the country and trying to 
reach Europe’ (Wintour and Smith 2020). Despite the slow pace at which 
returns to Turkey have taken place and the fact that the Turkish government 
decided to suspend returns altogether in March 2020 citing the pandemic, the 
EU agreed in July 2020 to provide an additional 585 million euros in huma-
nitarian bridge funding after the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey, in order 
to ensure the continued financing of the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) 
and Conditional Cash Transfers for Education (CCTE) programmes 
(European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy 2021, 8–9). Moreover, in December 2020, the 
European Commission confirmed that eight more contracts had been signed 
under the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey, meaning that the operational 
budget of this six billion euros facility had been fully committed and con-
tracted (European Commission 2020b). Thus, by threatening to send more 
migrants and asylum-seekers towards Europe and by demonstrating that it 
was able and ready to do so in practice, the Turkish government put pressure 
on the EU to ensure that the entire budget of EU Facility for Refugees in 
Turkey was committed and contracted. Moreover, despite that fact that it has 
not entirely fulfilled its end of the bargain when it comes to returns, the 
Turkish government has even managed to secure some additional funding to 
support those who have found refuge in Turkey.
Conclusion
This article set out to contribute to the debates on de-centring the analysis of 
migration governance in Europe by focusing on the potential role of external 
actors in the securitisation of asylum and migration in the EU. It addressed 
this hitherto neglected topic using the case of Turkey, which has considerably 
developed its relations on asylum, migration and borders with the EU in 
recent years.
Theoretically, this article has contributed to developing the securitisation 
framework by de-centring the study of securitisation processes. It has put 
forward the novel argument that, from the vantage point of an external actor, 
a securitisation process highlights the existence of a vulnerability to a specific 
phenomenon that is perceived to be threatening. An external actor can then 
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decide to exploit this vulnerability for its own gain, notably by making threats 
that play on the fears of the other political actor.
Empirically, this article has demonstrated how the Turkish government has 
been able to exploit the vulnerability of European countries to migration flows, 
which had been highlighted by the social construction of asylum and migration 
as security issues. By repeatedly threatening to send more asylum-seekers and 
migrants Europe’s way, the Turkish authorities have managed to secure some 
significant advantages in the last few years. Some of them have been financial, 
although the Turkish authorities have regularly complained about delays in 
receiving financial assistance from the EU. Others have been political, even 
though they have not all materialised yet, as shown by the slow progress made 
towards visa liberalisation. Unless the EU and European governments funda-
mentally change the way they socially construct migration flows, which appears 
unlikely at the time of writing, one can expect such dynamics to continue to 
characterise EU-Turkey relations in the years to come.
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